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COMMENTS
protective reach far beyond the one who contracts for it. The
state is greatly interested in the business of insurance, as may
be witnessed by the thousands upon thousands of statutory
regulations which seek to safeguard those dependent upon its
protection. And as a people we seem to be moving ever closer to
the view that the risks to which life is subject must be reduced
to a minimum as far as it may lie in our power to do so, whether
the particular individual does anything about it or not. Thus it
seems to follow that the rore such risks are assumed by business
the less the need will be for government to assume them. The
extent to which they can be so assumed in our competitive
society without an undue burden on the participants remains
to be seen. There is no such thing as free insurance. Somebody
must pay or a breakdown will be inevitable.
In any event, factors such as those suggested render any
treatment of legal principles which operate in the field of insur-
ance difficult if not impossible of analytical exactitude. This
will be discernible in the accompanying student examinations
of a group of subjects selected by them for study. The tendencies
hereinabove mentioned are reflected in the statutory and juris-
prudential treatment of warranties and representations, the con-
cepts of waiver and estoppel, direct actions, the complex rela-
tionships resulting from group insurance, as well as the adjust-
ment of the rights of multiple claimants and the insurer's
possible right to subrogation. The views expressed herein are,
of course, the views of the students. If it should be felt that in
some places there is too much detail and not enough in others
or too much emphasis here and not enough there, it should be
remembered that choices of the kind involved are not easy.
Although the reader mlay not find answers for which he may
yearn, he will find exposed most of the problems in the areas
considered. Perhaps, also, the attempt to weigh and evaluate
them may be helpful.
J. Denson Smith*
Some Legal Problems in Group Insurance
Group insurance covers the members of some specified group
under a single master policy without the normal requirement
that each insured be individually selected.' In these arrange-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. For general treatments of group insurance, see 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
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ments, the presence of an administrator of the master policy,
such as an employer or lending institution, in addition to the
insurer and insured group, has given rise to a number of prob-
lems peculiar to group insurance. Because the vast majority of
the cases have involved employee groups, this Comment will be
limited to a consideration of employee group, insurance. How-
ever, to the extent that other group arrangements have the same
operating characteristics, the same rules that apply to employee
groups should be applicable.
Before discussing the problems arising from group insur-
ance contracts it is necessary to consider the manner in which
such contracts are negotiated and operated.2 The policy generally
has its inception with negotiations between the employer and
the insurer. If a satisfactory agreement is reached, the insurer
issues a master policy to the employer setting forth the terms
and conditions of coverage for the individual insureds. The
policy may be either contributory or non-contributory. Under a
non-contributory policy all premiums are paid by the employer.
After arrangements between the employer and insurer have
been completed, the employee is issued a certificate which in-
forms him that he is insured under the master policy and which
may, in addition, contain some of the terms and conditions of
the insurance. If the policy is contributory, a portion of the
premium is deducted from the insured employee's pay and the
remainder is paid by the employer. Where such a policy is in-
volved, the employee is not covered as soon as the employer
and insurer have reached an agreement. Rather, he is merely
notified that he may obtain coverage by making an application
and authorizing the employer to apply a portion of his wages
to payment of his share of the premium. The terms of the
master policy usually provide that the employee will be insured
as of the date of his request for coverage.3 The date of the
issuance of the certificate is not necessarily the date coverage
begins.
LAW AND PRACTICE § 41 et scq. (1948) ; VANCE, INSURANCE 1031 (3d ed. 1951)
Cox, Group Insurance Contracts for Employees, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 211 (1959)
Hianft, Group Life Insurance: Its Legal Aspects, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 70
(1935).
2. For a more detailed treatment of these aspects of group insurance than is
given here, see Cox, Group Insurance Contracts for Employees, 38 TEXAS L. REV.
211 (1959). The other authorities cited in note 1 supra are also helpful.
3. Id. at 214: "As to the commencement of insurance of an individual em-
ployee, . . . if the policy is contributory, a customary provision is that each eligible
employee who requests insurance and agrees to make the required contribution
shall become insured on the date of such request or on the date he becomes eligible,
whichever is later... "
[Vol. XXII
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Generally, the employer performs many of the administra-
tive details necessarily connected with the group insurance
arrangement. He receives applications for coverage, issues cer-
tificates furnished by the insurer, remits premium payments,
and keeps the insurer informed as to the employees who should
be added or dropped from coverage. Applications for a change
in the beneficiary of a life policy and claims of loss under dis-
ability policies are also sometimes distributed, collected and
forwarded by the employer.
It can be seen that in group contract operation there are
more opportunities for disputes to arise than under the ordi-
nary individual policy where there is no certificate and no third
person corresponding to the employer. For instance, the master
policy may be issued in one state and the certificate in another,
with a consequent dispute over the applicable state law. There
may be a variance between the terms of the certificate and those
of the master policy. The employer has ample opportunity to
make errors in his administration of the policy and so give birth
to questions of the existence or scope of the empoyee's coverage.
From a strictly analytical standpoint the solutions to these and
related questions depends on a determination of the legal rela-
tions created between the employer, the employee, and the in-
sured.
Employee - Party or Third Party Beneficiary?
There is disagreement on the question of whether the em-
ployee-insured under a group contract is a party to a contract
with the insurer or a third party beneficiary of a contract be-
tween the insurer and the employer. Generally this question is
not the basic issue litigated, and statements as to the contractual
status of the employee appear in the rationale of the cases to
support holdings on other issues. Thus statements that the
employee is a party to the contract may be found in the rationale
of cases ruling in favor of the employee on such points as
whether his consent was required in order to modify the policy,4
whether notice of a change in the policy should have been given
him,5 and whether the law of the state where the certificate
was issued governed the contract." Similarly, cases holding
4. Shears v. All States Life Ins. Co., 242 Ala. 249, 5 So.2d 808 (1942) ; Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 190 Okla. 363, 123 P.2d 656 (1942).
5. Poch v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 343 Pa. 119, 22 A.2d 590 (1941)
(master policy holder was an association of steelworkers).
6. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 75 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App.
1961]
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against the employee often contain statements indicating that
the employee is not a party to the contract, but a beneficiary
of the contract between the employer and the insurer.7  Some
cases have indicated that the employee is a party to a contribu-
tory policy but a third party beneficiary under a non-contribu-
tory policy.8
Louisiana's position on the question of the contractual status
of the employee is not certain. The case of Austin v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co.9 indicates that an employee under a non-
contributory policy is a third party beneficiary.' 0 Dictum in
Carpenter v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co." indicates that the em-
ployee insured under a contributory policy is also a third party
beneficiary, but no Louisiana case was found ruling squarely on
this point.
What Constitutes the Contract?
The proposition that the master policy issued to the employer
1934); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Worton, 70 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934). The idea that the employee was a party to the contract seemed implicit
in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Harper, 189 Ark. 170, 70 S.W.2d 1042 (1934).
7. Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937) (ques-
tion of applicable state law) ; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Hall, 253 Ky.
450, 69 S.W.2d 977 (1934) (question of whether employer acted as insurer's
agent); Phillips v. Great National Life Ins. Co., 226 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1948) (question of whether employee entitled to notice of change in cover-
age); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 75 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1934) (question of applicable state law).
8. Parks v. Prudential Ins. Co., 103 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Tenn. 1951) (con-
flict between terms of certificate and terms of master policy) ; Shears v. All
States Life Ins. Co., 242 Ala. 249, 5 So.2d 808 (1942) (question of whether
consent of employee required in order to terminate coverage) ; Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Wilson, 190 Okla. 363, 123 P.2d 656 (1942) (question of whether consent
or notice required) ; Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 75 S.W.2d 329
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (dispute over applicable state law).
9. 142 So. 337 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932).
10. In the Austin case the master policy was cancelled by the insurer at the
request of the employer. Later the beneficiary attempted to recover from the
insurer, contending that the certificate which had been issued to the employee
was a contract of insurance between the employee and the insurer. The court
held that the master policy, rather than the certificate, was the contract of insur-
ance which had covered the employee and seemed to rely on the idea that the
employee was not a party to the contract. Dictum in Watkins v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 174 So. 885 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937) supports the idea that the
employee is not a party to the contract at least where the master policy is non-
contributory.
11. 159 So. 467 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935). In Carpenter an employee at-
tempted to claim disability benefits in accordance with the provisions of a con-
tributory policy which had been replaced by another contributory policy insuring
only life. After pointing out that the employee had consented to the change,
the court said (id. at 468) : "However, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
dealt with and issued its policy to the Southern Pacific Company, to whom it
looked for the collection of the premium and with whom it had a perfect right
to agree to a cancellation of the original policy, or the substitution of a new
one with whatever coverage and such other conditions as might prove mutually
satisfactory."
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is a part of the contract 12 under which his employees are in-
sured has seldom been challenged in cases involving disputes
over substantive issues.'8 The status of the certificate issued
to an employee, however, is not so clear. From a substantive
standpoint 4 the status of the certificate is usually important
to the parties15 for two purposes: to determine which state's
laws should govern the provisions of the policy, and to resolve
disputes arising when the terms of the certificate differ from
those of the master policy.
In holding the contract completed in, and so governed by the
law of, the state where the master policy was issued and deliv-
ered, a number of cases have used the argument that the certifi-
cate is not a part of the contract. 6 This result has also been
supported by reliance on policy provisions referring to applicable
state law and on the idea that the policy should be uniformly
interpreted everywhere.' 7 Support for the proposition that the
contract does not include the certificate has been derived both
from specific policy provisions' and from the contention that
12. Strictly speaking, the master policy is not a part of the contract of insur-
ance. It is evidence, though perhaps conclusive evidence, of the contract. However,
it is convenient, when writing on this matter, to refer to the master policy and
certificate as part of the contract and this is done throughout the paper.
13. One of the few cases to do so is Austin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 142
So. 337 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932). There, beneficiary contended that the certifi-
cate issued to the insured employee under a non-contributory policy constituted
the entire contract between the employee and the insurer. The beneficiary based
this contention on La. Acts 1916, No. 227, which provided in part that every
life insurance policy issued or delivered in Louisiana should contain the entire
contract between the parties. The court held that the master policy, rather than
the certificate, was the type of instrument contemplated by the statute. Often
the master policy provides that it, together with the application of the employer
and the individual applications of the employees, if any, shall constitute the
entire contract between the parties. Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Ins.
Co., 301 U.S. 196 (193T) ; Germain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 285 Mich. 318, 280
N.W. 776 (1938); Riske v. National Casualty Co., 268 Wis. 199, 67 N.W.2d
385 (1954).
14. Procedural problems are beyond the scope of this Comment.
15. Questions of which state should be able to regulate group insurance on a
broader plane and specify such things as insurable groups and minimum enroll-
ment are beyond the scope of this Comment.
16. Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937)
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 101 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. La. 1951) ; Light
v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 35 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. La. 1940) ; McBride
v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 14 F. Supp. 240 (W.D. La. 1935) ; Con-
necticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 75 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
The Moore case involved a suit on both contributory and non-contributory policies.
Both master policies were issued and delivered outside of Texas and certificates
under both policies were issued to employees in Texas. The court held that penal-
ties and attorney fees allowed by Texas law could not be recovered under the non-
contributory policy but were recoverable under the contributory policy.
17. Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937).
18. Sometimes the master policy provides that the master policy, the applica-
tion of the employer, and the applications of the individual insureds shall con-
stitute the entire contract between the parties. In the Boseman case, cited in note
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the employee is not a party to the contract.19 At least one case
has held that the certificate is part of a contributory policy but
not part of a non-contributory policy. 20 Cases holding that the
law of the state where the certificate is issued governs the policy
provisions have generally based this conclusion on the idea that
the contract was completed in that state, where the certificate
was issued to the employee. 21 One case has indicated that public
policy dictates this conclusion. 22
The problem of what rights an employee has when the terms
of the certificate differ from those of the master policy has been
handled in various ways. It has been said that where there is a
difference between the terms of the master policy and the cer-
tificate, the certificate is a part of the contract and is con-
trolling.2 3 At least one case involving such a conflict has in-
dicated that a certificate issued under a contributory policy is
a part of the contract since the employee is a party to it, while
under a non-contributory policy the certificate merely evidences
the right of the employee as a third party beneficiary. 24
17 supra, the court relied in part on such language to conclude that the certifi-
cate was not a part of the contract.
19. Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937)
(contributory policy). In Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 75 S.W.2d
329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) the court appeared tacitly to proceed on this idea.
20. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 75 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1934) so held on both these points where a question of applicable state law
for the purpose of assessing penalties and attorney fees was involved.
21. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Harper, 189 Ark. 170, 70 S.W.2d 1042
(1934) ; Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. )ent, 84 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App.
1935) (contributory policy); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 75
S.W\.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (reached this result with respect to contribu-
tory policy); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Worton, 70 S.W. 2d 216 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1934) (contributory policy).
22. Thieme v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 12 111. App.2d 110, 138 N.E.2d 857
(1956). In this case the master policy holder was a labor union. The master
policy had been issued and delivered outside of Illinois. The employee involved,
an Illinois worker, received his certificate in Illinois and a portion of his union
dues went to the payment of the premium. The court stated that the master
policy contained no provision as to applicable state law and that the public policy
of Illinois with respect to the regulation of insurance was at issue. It then con-
cluded that Illinois law should be utilized in interpreting the contract.
23. John Ilancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 108 F.2d 220 (9th Cir.
1939). That the certificate should control only where such a rule is more favor-
able to the employee is indicated by Rothermel v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 275 Mich.
425, 266 N.W. 404 (1936). In Rothermel, the insurer sought to limit the em-
ployee's rights to those granted under a provision in the certificate. The court,
ruling against the insurer on this point, stated that the certificate was issued
under the terms and conditions of the master policy. In Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Whitler, 172 F.2d 631 (7th Cir. 1949) the master policy named one bene-
ficiary and the certificate another. The court held that the designation in the
certificate governed.
24. Parks v. Prudential Ins. Co., 103 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Tenn. 1951.) (con-
tributory master policy and certificate were originally in harmony but master
policy was later amended without notice to the employee).
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Estoppel has also been used to allow recovery in accordance
with the terms of the certificate, 25 the idea being that the in-
surer may not assert the terms of the master policy to contradict
the provisions of the certificate, but there seems to be a conflict
in the decisions on the question of whether or not estoppel
created by a variance between the certificate and master policy
may be used to enlarge coverage.2 6
No Louisiana decision was discovered involving a conflict
between the terms of the certificate27 and master policy or a
question of applicable state law. However, in Austin v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., the contention that a certificate issued
under a non-contributory policy constitutes the entire contract
was rejected.2 8 The court went on to state that the master policy
was the entire contract. Federal district courts sitting in Lou-
isiana, in keeping with the Boseman29 case, have held that the
25. Riske v. National Casualty Co., 268 Wis. 199, 67 N.W.2d 385 (1954)
(certificate covered spouse but master policy did not).
26. In Riske v. National Casualty Co., 268 Wis. 199, 67 N.W.2d 385 (1954)
it was held that a provision in the certificate granting coverage to the employee's
spouse prevailed over a master policy indicating otherwise. The court said that
the certificate "effectively estops the respondent from showing that the coverage,
conditions, and limitations of the policy are different from those stated in the
certificate." Id. at 207, 67 N.W.2d at 389. Pool v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 26
Ala. App. 161, 155 So. 631 (1934) indicates a contrary rule with respect to ex-
tension of coverage, though perhaps what the court said on that point was dictum.
It is interesting to note that a similar split of authority has arisen in cases
involving the effect of incontestability clauses on group policies. Some courts
have taken the position that such clauses cannot enlarge the coverage of the
policy. Washington National Insurance Co. v. Burch, 270 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.
1959); Fisher v. United States Life Ins. Co., 249 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1957);
Rasmussen v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 239 Mich. 482, 292 N.W. 377
(1940) ; John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dorman, 108 F.2d 220 (9th Cir.
1939) ; Eagon v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 2 App. Div.2d 843, 156 N.Y.S.2d
57 (1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 785, 164 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1957). Louisiana has taken
the view that under a group policy the incontestable clause will not serve to
extend coverage. In Allison v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 158 So. 389 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1935), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 161 So. 645 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1935), the court said that an incontestable clause would not extend coverage. It
then held that the question of whether or not an employee in the firm which
had secured the contributory policy was actively employed at the time a rider
increasing insurance was attached, was a question of validity and not coverage.
27. Dictum to the effect that a certificate issued in accordance with a con-
tributory policy is not part of the contract may be found in Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 142 So. 721 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932). There an employee
attempted to effect a change in the beneficiary of a contributory policy by apply-
ing through the employer. His application was mailed, but he died before action
on it was taken by the insurer. In holding that the beneficiary had not been
changed, the court noted that the provisions of the master policy controlled with
respect to the manner of changing beneficiary. However, there appears to have
been no real conflict between the provisions of the certificate and master policy.
28. 142 So. 337 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932). This contention was based on La.
Acts 1916, No. 227, which provided in part that life insurance contracts delivered
in Louisiana should contain the entire contract between the parties without
incorporating other terms by reference.
29. Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937). See
notes 16, 17, 19, supra.
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law of Louisiana is not applicable to master policies issued and
delivered elsewhere even though the certifiates are issued to
employees in Louisiana. 30 Louisiana has a statute requiring the
issuance of a certificate to each insured under a group life
policy setting forth a statement as to his insurance protection.31
Similar policy provisions have been used to support recovery by
the employee in accordance with the terms of the certificate
where it conflicts with the master policy.8 2
Employer as Agent of the Insurer
The cases are in conflict on the question of whether the
employer is an agent of the group insurer. This question arises
when an employee claims that the insurer is bound by the policy
despite the failure of the employer to perform some adminis-
trative task under the policy. The problem also arises when
the employer has misled the employee as to the existence or
extent of his coverage and the employee attempts to recover
in accordance with the contract as he has been led to believe it
existed.
Some cases have held the employer to be the agent of the
insurer for collecting premiums,33 for receiving notice and proof
30. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 101 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. La.
1951) ; Light v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 35 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. La.
1940); McBride v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 14 F. Supp. 240 (W.D.
La. 1935).
31. LA. R.S. 22:176(7) (1950) provides that each master policy insuring life
must provide that a certificate "setting forth a statement as to the insurance
protection to which he is entitled, to whom payable, together with the provisions
concerning conversion rights" shall be issued to each insured.
32. Riske v. National Casualty Co., 268 Wis. 199, 67 N.W.2d 385 (1954)
involved a certificate issued under such a statutorily required policy provision.
The court there held an insurer estopped to maintain that the master policy did
not provide protection for the employee's spouse where such protection was set
forth in the certificate. It stated that such a provision was a representation that
the insurer's interpretation of essential features, coverage, and conditions of the
policy was to be found in the certificate. The court added that it could find no
purpose in requiring such a certificate if it was to be given no effect. In Parks
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 103 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Tenn. 1951) a provision in the
policy for the issuance of such a certificate appears to have been used to support
a conclusion that the certificate was a part of the employee's contract with the
employer and hence controlling.
33. Shanks v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Okla. 1938); All
States Life Ins. Co. v. Tillman, 226 Ala. 245, 146 So. 393 (1932) ; Greer v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 180 S.C. 162, 185 S.E. 68 (1936). Where the policy
is non-contributory, the failure of the employer to pay the premium is generally
held to terminate the employee's coverage. All States Life Ins. Co. v. Steward,
242 Ala. 258, 5 So.2d 784 (1942) ; Tedesco v. Turner & Seymour Manufacturing
Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 192, 110 A.2d 650 (1954) ; Curd v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 51
Ga. App. 306, 180 S.E. 249 (1935). It is interesting to note that in cases where
the employee failed to make his contribution but the employer nevertheless paid
the entire premium it has been held that coverage continued notwithstanding
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of loss, 34 and for changing the beneficiary of a life policy.35 On
the other hand there are cases holding the employer not the
agent of the insurer in performing similar functions.36  The
cases are also divided on the question of whether or not the
insurer is bound by statements or conduct on the part of the
employer which misleads the employee as to his rights under the
policy. 37
In Louisiana it appears that the insurer is responsible for
failure of the employer to perform administrative duties, but
the extent to which the insurer will be responsible for mis-
leading conduct of the employer is not clear. In the leading
language in the policy indicating the contrary. Sun Life Assur. Co. v. Dalton,
302 Ky. 712, 196 S.W.2d 383 (1946); Shea v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 292 Mass.
575, 198 N.E. 909 (1935). Likens v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
246 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1957) allowed an employee to recover in this situation
on the ground that the insurer, after receiving the premium, was estopped to
deny the employee's coverage.
34. Coleman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 127 S.W.2d 764 (Mo. App. 1939)
(form instructed employee to deliver it to employer) ; Sullivan v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 110 S.W. 2d 870 (Mo. App. 1937) ; Porter v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc., 71 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. App. 1934).
35. Kaiser v. Prudential Ins. Co., 272 Wis. 527, 76 N.W.2d 311 (1956) held
that an alleged beneficiary under a non-contributory life policy who contended
that the insured employee had given the employer a properly executed application
for change of beneficiary stated a cause of action. The court said that though
under non-contributory policies the employer is not the insurer's agent in matters
of administration such as paying premiums and reporting changes in the insured
group because the employer stands in an adverse position with respect to the
insurer as to these items, yet the employer has no adverse position with respect
to the distribution of the proceeds.
36. Rivers v. State Capital Life Insurance Co., 245 N.C. 461, 98 S.E.2d 431
(1957) (employer refused tender of employee's share of premium) ; Ammons v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 205 N.C. 23, 169 S.E. 807 (1933) (employee furnished
proof of loss to employer) ; Hanaieff v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 371 Pa. 560,
92 A.2d 202 (1952) (employer refused tender of employee's share of premium).
37. The following cases indicate that the employer is not the agent of the
insurer for the purposes of binding him by waiver or estoppel. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 203 Ark. 1103, 160 S.W.2d 852 (1942). Here the employer
notified the insurer that the employee's employment had terminated at a time
when it probably had not. Action by the employer with respect to the employee
may have led the employee to believe that he was still considered employed. The
court refused to impute knowledge of the employee's actual status to the insurer,
saying it could rely on the report of the employer. Lancaster v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 54 Ga. App. 718, 189 S.E. 79 (1936) (employer told employee he was cov-
ered under old policy); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Hall, 253 Ky. 450, 69
S.W.2d 977 (1934) (employer issued life certificate to employee knowing that
employee was too old to receive disability benefits) ; Duval v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 82 N.H. 543, 136 Atl. 400 (1927) (employer could not waive employment
as condition to coverage). Other cases have held the company bound in situations
similar to those above. Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. McCrary, 103 Ga. App. 549,
120 S.E.2d 134 (1961) (insurer held to employer's knowledge as to whether
insured was full-time employee) ; Cason v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 91 Ga.
App. 323, 85 S.E.2d 568 (1954) (insurer bound to employer's knowledge that
employee sick when increase effected) ; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Florence,
47 Ga. App. 711, 171 S.E. 317 (1933) insurer held to employer's knowledge of
whether insured was employee).
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case of Neider v. Continental Assur. Co., 8 the employer told the
employee that premiums were paid for him as long as he was
on the payroll. Because of the employer's complicated book-
keeping system the employee was paid two weeks after his
employment had terminated and after premium payment on his
behalf had been discontinued by the employer. The court found
that the employee was reasonable in believing that deductions
were being made from his salary and applied to the payment
of premiums and allowed recovery under the policy. The court
stated that,
"We feel that the employer owes to the employee the duty of
good faith and due care in attending to the policy, and that
the employer should make clear to the employee anything
required of him to keep the policy in effect, and the time that
the obligations are due. In its position as administrator of
the policy, the employer should be considered as the agent of
the insurer, and any omission of duty to the employee in its
administration should be attributable to the insurer."39
Neider seems clearly to have established the proposition that,
with respect to at least some acts of administration, the em-
ployer acts as agent of the insurer, though there were indica-
tions to the contrary in the prior jurisprudence. 40
It should be noted that in the Neider case the employer did
not mislead the employee as to the terms and conditions of the
policy but only misled him on the question of whether he was
38. 213 La. 621, 35 So.2d 237, 2 A.L.R.2d 846 (1948).
39. 213 La. 621, 631, 35 So.2d 237, 240 (1948).
40. Holloman v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 188 So. 500 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1939) involved employees insured under ordinary policies who subscribed to
a "Salary Savings Franchise" plan under which their employer agreed to deduct
their premiums from wages and forward them to the insurer. The employer's
failure to pay premiums timely resulted in loss of coverage of an employee and
the beneficiary later sued the insurer alleging, among other things, that the em-
ployer acted as its agent in collecting and remitting premiums. The court
analogize(] this insurance arrangenuent to a group contract, and appeared to rely
on group insurance cases holding the employer not an agent of the insurer in
refusing recovery. In Peyton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 148 So. 721 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1933) an employee whose employment was terminated and who
was notified that this would terminate his insurance unless he exercised an option
to convert his group policy to an individual policy later sought recovery against
the insurer. Among other things lie contended that the insurer accepted premiums
in his behalf after his employment was terminated and was therefore estopped
to assert that his coverage expired at the termination of employment. The court
stated that this plea was filed too late to be of any effect against the insurer.
It added, however, that the acceptance of premiums could have no effect against
the insurer since the insurer did not know of any change in the employee's status.
Thus the court impliedly ruled out the idea that knowledge of the employer should
be imputed to the insurer.
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earning a salary from which premium payments were being
deducted. Whether misleading action as to the terms or condi-
tions of coverage would fall within the scope of the administra-
tive functions of the employer for which he is the insurer's
agent remains to be determined.
Cancellation or Amendment of the Policy - Necessity of
Consent or Notice?
Sometimes the employer and insurer undertake to modify or
terminate group insurance coverage by mutual agreement or by
unilateral act. When the employee later attempts to recover
from the insurer he does so by contending that his consent was
necessary in order to effect a change in his coverage or that
the insurer should at least have given him notice of the change
in his status. Frequently the employee has a valuable conversion
privilege41 which he might exercise within a limited time after
termination of his coverage so that notice has an importance
to him beyond his normal desire to be informed as to his current
insurance status.
The rationale of cases involving consent and notice questions
has been varied. Among the reasons given for requiring notice
have been the existence of a conversion privilege42 and the con-
tributory nature of the policy.43 The idea that the employee is
a party to the contract has also influenced courts to require
notice.44 One case, though speaking of the employee as a third
party beneficiary, required notice by interpreting the words
"termination of employment" in a policy providing for a cessa-
tion of coverage upon termination of employment to mean a
41. A conversion privilege entitles the employee to have issued to him, upon
timely application and payment of premium, an individual life policy in the
amount of the group policy without furnishing evidence of insurability. The effect
of the conversion privilege is not entirely settled. It is clear that if it is exercised
and a new individual policy issued this policy becomes the contract under which
the employee is covered. But what if the employee dies within the time in which
he could have exercised his conversion privilege but has not done so? The case
law in most jurisdictions where the question has arisen is to the effect that
the conversion privilege does not operate to keep the group policy in effect, but
is only an option and so the beneficiary cannot recover in such a situation. The
minority view is that coverage continues under the group policy for this period.
See cases cited in Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 8 (1959). Louisiana has adopted a statute
specifically providing that each master policy must contain a provision granting
insurance in the amount of the obtainable individual policy as a claim under the
group policy if the employee dies during a time within which he could have
exercised his conversion privilege. LA. R.S. 22:176(12) (1950).
42. Nick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 354 Mo. 376, 189 S.W.2d 532 (1945).
43. Ibid.
44. Poch v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 343 Pa. 119, 22 A.2d 590 (1941)
(contributory policy; both consent and notice required).
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termination of employment with notice.4 5 Among the reasons
given for refusing to require notice have been the following:
the possibility of conversion was not open to the employee,"o
the terms of the policy did not require notice,47 and the em-
ployee's insurance was a gratuity.48
The contributory nature of the policy has led some courts
to hold the employee a party to the contract at least to the
extent that it cannot be modified without his consent.49 On the
ground that the employee and his beneficiary had vested inter-
ests in the policies, one case held that an agreement between
the insurer and the employer was ineffective to terminate cov-
erage of an employee under both contributory and non-contribu-
tory policies.5 0 A requirement of consent has been refused on
the ground that the employee is not a party to the contract. 1
Louisiana's position on the question of whether notice must
be given or consent obtained is not certain. In Austin v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. the cancellation of an entire non-contribu-
tory master policy was held to terminate coverage of the em-
ployees formerly insured thereunder.5 2 Language in Carpenter
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. indicates that a contributory policy
also may be cancelled or modified by the insurer and employer
without consulting the employee.53 This was only dictum, how-
ever, because there the employee involved learned of the pro-
posed change prior to loss and applied for new coverage. From
these two cases an inference (though it rests on shaky ground)
may be drawn that there is no necessity to obtain the employee's
consent under either contributory or non-contributory policies.
45. Emerick v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 60, 179 At. 335
(1935) (contributory policy).
46. Riefler v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 21 Ill. App. 2d 122, 157 N.E.2d
429 (1959) ; Satz v. Prudential Ins. Co., 225 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. App. 1949) (Con-
tributory policy). In Satz it was also said that the employee was too old to obtain
other insurance.
47. Satz v. Prudential Ins. Co., 225 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. App. 1949) (contribu-
tory policy) ; Huston v. Travelers Ins. Co., 79 Ohio App. 177, 70 N.E. 2d 672
(1946).
48. Phillips v. Great Nat. Life Ins. Co., 226 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948) (non-contributory).
49. Shears v. All States Life Ins. Co., 242 Ala. 249, 5 So.2d 808 (1942);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 190 Okla. 363, 123 P.2d 656 (1942).
50. Hinkler v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 61 Ohio App. 140, 22 N.E.2d 451
(1938).
51. Davis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 161 Tenn. 655, 32 S.W.2d 1034
(1930); Phillips v. Great Nat. Life Ins. Co., 226 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948). See also Satz v. Prudential Ins. Co., 225 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. App. 1949);
Butler v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 233 Mo. App. 94, 93 S.W.2d 1019 (1936).
52. See notes 9, 10, 28, supra.
53. See note 11 supra.
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The Neider5 4 case, holding the insurer responsible for mislead-
ing conduct of the employer which caused the employee to believe
his insurance was still in effect, is closely analogous to situations
in which other jurisdictions have required notice.55 This, coupled
with its result, probably indicates that Louisiana will require
notice.
Duty of Employer to Employee
When the employer takes out a group insurance policy, cer-
tainly he does not become an insurer of the employee.56 How-
ever, a duty to properly administer the policy has been main-
tained by some cases involving contributory policies.57 It has
been held that an employer who had sufficient funds belonging
to his employee to pay a premium but who failed to do so,
causing the employee's coverage to terminate, is liable to the
employee.58 The employer has also been held responsible for
failure to give notice to an employee of the fact that the employer
considered the employee's coverage terminated.59 At least one
54. See note 38 supra.
55. The Neider case is closely analogous to situations in which employment
is terminated without the employee's knowledge. For a more detailed treatment
than is given below of the problems which arise in connection with termination
of employment, see Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 8 (1959). Generally, an employee's cov-
erage terminates when his employment ends. Usually he is aware of the fact
that he is no longer employed. However, this is not always true. Some cases
have held that notice of the employer's intention to consider the employment at
an end must be given to a sick or laid-off employee in order for his coverage to
be terminated by this action on the part of the employer. Nick v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 354 Mo. 376, 189 S.W. 2d 532 (1945) ; Melikian v. Lincoln National Life
Insurance Co., 185 Pa. Super. 209, 138 A.2d 170 (1958). The Nick case furnishes
a good example of this kind of situation. There the policy provided that a tem-
porary lay-off should not be considered termination of employment unless the
employer elected to consider it such. A jury found that the employee had been
temporarily laid off and that the employer had elected to consider this a termina-
tion of employment. The court held that the employee was entitled to notice of
this election before his insurance could be terminated.
56. Carpenter v. Chicago & E.I.R.R., 21 Ind. App. 88, 51 N.E. 493 (1898)
Wheeler v. Monsanto Chemical Works, 263 S.W. 881 (Mo. App. 1924) ; Gallagher
v. Simmons Hardware Co., 214 Mo. App. 111, 258 S.W. 16 (1924).
57. None of the cases examined allowed recovery against an employer for
cancellation or poor administration of a non-contributory policy.
58. Peyton v. United States Steel Co., 368 Pa. 591, 84 A.2d 192 (1951). The
measure of recovery in such a case is the amount of insurance the employee would
have received under the policy. There is a difference between the situation where
the employer's failure to pay causes the employee to lose coverage and the situa-
tion in which the employer never takes out the insurance on the employee. In
the first situation the employer's misconduct has caused the employee to lose
coverage while in the second he is prevented from acquiring it. Thus in the first
situation it would appear that an employee who is not individually insurable
would have a cause of action, while in the second he would not. Minter v. Georgia
Piggly-Wiggly Co., 185 Ga. 116, 194 S.E. 176 (1937) sustained a demurrer in
the second situation above when the employee failed to allege that, in reliance
on the employer, he had failed to get other coverage which he could have obtained.
59. Keane v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 22 N.J. Super. 296, 91 A.2d 875 (1952);
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case has denied recovery to a life beneficiary on the ground that
any duty owed by the employer in the administration of the
policy is owed only to the insured employee or his personal rep-
resentative.60 Two more recent decisions have held, however,
that an employer is responsible to such a beneficiary for failure
to make the required deductions and payments without notifying
the employee.61
Louisiana's position with respect to the employer's liability
to the insured employee is not certain. The only Louisiana
decision discovered involving a suit by an employee against his
employer arising out of a group insurance contract was Peyton
v. Morgan's Louisiana R.R. & S.S. Co.6 2 There the beneficiaries
of a contributory policy insuring an employee who had been
discharged and appropriately notified of his conversion privi-
lege, later sued the employer. In holding that their petition
stated no cause of action against the employer, the court pointed
out that it contained no allegation that the employer agreed to
insure the employee, withheld premiums which should have been
Quinten v. United States Steel Corp., 186 Pa. Super. 384, 142 A.2d 370 (1958).
In Keane the court held that the insured's employment had terminated within the
meaning of the policy and so found the insurer not bound by the policy even
though the employee had not been notified that his employment had terminated.
The court went on to hold the employer responsible to the employee, stating that
without regard to technical principles of agency, the employer should be charged
with some obligations in administering the policy or a socially significant plan
of protection would be lost.
60. Meyerson v. New Idea Hosiery Co., 217 Ala. 153, 115 So. 94 (1928). Here
the beneficiary of a contributory life policy sought recovery against an employer
who, without notifying the employee, had allowed the policy to lapse by failing
to make the required deductions and premium payments. The court said that
although in view of the employer's undertaking to pay the insurance out of the
insured's pay, he was under a duty to notify the insured before allowing his
insurance to lapse, nevertheless a breach of this duty would only give rise to a
cause of action in favor of the insured or his personal representative. Assuming
that an employer should be held to owe a duty of notice to the employee in a
situation such as Meyerson, the result reached there appears unsound. If the
personal representative of the deceased insured has the right of action in behalf
of the deceased's estate, it appears that the duty is rendered illusory. Under the
policy the insurer never was obligated to pay anything to the insured, so what
should his personal representative recover? The value of the right to name a
,beneficiary? If the personal representative is to sue in behalf of the beneficiary,
then matters are unduly complicated.
61. Keane v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 22 N..J. Super. 296, 91 A.2d 875 (1952)
Quinten v. United States Steel Corp., 186 Pa. Super. 384, 142 A.2d 370 (1958).
In Keane the court said that where the insured designated the beneficiary with
the manifest intention that the beneficiary should benefit there was no valid
reason for defeating that purpose by applying concepts which might foster justice
in other situations, but which would defeat it here. In Quinten the court said
that the answer to the contention that the employer owed a duty only to the
insured was that the employer had failed to notify anyone.
62. 148 So. 724 (La. App. Or]. Cir. 1933). This case was a companion to
the employee's suit against the insurer and it is in the suit against the insurer
that the court discusses the claim against the employer. Peyton v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 148 So. 721 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933).
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transmitted to the insurer, or failed to pay over proceeds re-
ceived from the insurer. 3 In Neider v. Continental Assur. Co.,64
involving a suit against an insurer based on a contributory
policy, it was stated that the employer owes the employee a
duty of good faith and due care in administering the policy.
The court went on to hold, however, that in performing this
duty the employer acts as the agent of the insurer so that a
breach of the duty does not result in termination of the em-
ployee's coverage. This being so, it seems that in such a situa-
tion the employer has caused the employee no loss and conse-
quently should not be subject to suit by the employee. Whether
the range of the employer's duty to the employee extends beyond
the ambit of the employer's agency has not been decided.
Suggestions
Because of the great conflict in legal theory surrounding
group insurance contract, some speculation as to the desirable
legal relations between the parties involved might prove helpful.
In this section some thoughts on the problems previously dis-
cussed will be advanced.
On a strictly analytical basis it seems that an employee in-
sured under a contributory group policy is a party to a contract
of insurance with the insurer. In order to be deemed such it is
necessary that he reach an agreement with the insurer sup-
ported by consideration. The employee enters contractual nego-
tiations with the insurer by filling out his application for cover-
age, whether this be regarded as an offer or acceptance. He
bargains for coverage and by authorizing the payment of a
portion of the premium from his salary gives consideration to
support the insurer's undertaking to insure. Many master poli-
cies contain provisions that the master policy, the application
of the employer, and the individual applications of the employees
shall constitute the entire contract between the parties." Thus,
63. These statements actually appear in a companion case involving the em-
ployee's suit against his former insurer. Peyton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
148 So. 721 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933). In the suit against the employer the
court stated that it had discussed the entire matter in the insurer case and would
therefore only make reference to that opinion.
64. 213 La. 621, 35 So.2d 237, 2 A.L.R.2d 846 (1948).
65. In this connection see the policy language discussed in the following cases:
Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937) ; Commercial
Ins. Co. v. Burnquist, 105 F. Supp. 920 (N.D.Iowa 1952) ; Equitable Life Assur.
Soc. v. Smith, 260 Ky. 56, 83 S.W.2d 885 (1935) ; Germain v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 285 Mich. 318, 280 N.W. 776 (1938) ; Riske v. National Casualty Co., 268
Wis. 199, 67 N.W.2d 385 (1954). Louisiana has a statute which provides in part
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they imply that the employee is a party since if the employee's
individual application is part of the contract it is only logical
to conclude that he is a party thereto. It should be noted at
this point that there are as many contracts as there are insureds
under the above analysis, even though the terms of all of them
may be evidenced by the same master policy.
The idea that the employer has an interest in seeing that
insurance is available to his employees and that he has a con-
tract with the insurer are not inconsistent with the view that
the employee is a party to a contract with the insurer. A contract
does exist between the employer and the insurer, but it is not a
contract of insurance. No one is insured in a contributory policy
situation solely by virtue of an agreement between the employer
and the insurer. Action on the part of the individual employee
is necessary, and only after it is taken does coverage arise.
The employee's application for insurance should not be regarded
as the acceptance, as a third party beneficiary, of a stipulation
in his favor. First, no coverage exists as to the employee until
he applies, while if he were a third party beneficiary he would
be insured upon agreement to that effect between the insurer
and employee. In the second place, the employee does more than
accept. He gives something to the insurer in order to secure an
advantage.
Under a non-contributory policy the employee should prop-
erly be considered a third party beneficiary because his coverage
arises without any action on his part. He engages in no con-
tractual negotiations with the insurer, through an agent or
otherwise, and gives no consideration to the insurer. In Anglo-
American jurisdictions where the insurance is gratuitous, i.e.,
not furnished by the employer in response to some actual or
asserted duty, the employee should be considered a donee bene-
ficiary.66 Where the coverage is not gratuitous the employee
that in the case of life insurance a copy of "the application, if any, of the policy-
holder" shall be attached to the policy when issued. LA. R. S. 22:176(1) (1950).
It might be wondered what effect the inclusion of the employer's application in
the contract insuring the employee should have on his contractual status vis a vta
the insurer. The answer is, none. Under such a provision the employer's applica-
tion seems clearly a part of the contract. Probably the purpose of this is to
make available to the insurer defenses based on inaccuracies in that application.
However, the fact that the employee agrees to make this instrument a part of
his contract cannot alter his status as a party, if he is one otherwise.
66. Under the definitions given in RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 133 (1932),
a person other than the promisee who will be benefitted by the promise is a
donee beneficiary "if it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the
accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the
promise of all or a part of the performance thereof is to make a gift to the bene-
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should be deemed a creditor beneficiary. 67  If circumstances
indicate that the employee actually bargained with the insurer
he should properly be considered to have a contract with the
insurer notwithstanding the fact that premiums are paid by
his employer. In Louisiana the rights of a third party bene-
ficiary do not depend upon whether the stipulation in his favor
was secured with the intent of making a gift ;68 therefore the dis-
tinctions between the donee and creditor beneficiaries in Anglo-
American law are unimportant in Louisiana.
Whether or not the employee is a party or a third party
beneficiary to the contract under which he is insured, the terms
of the certificate should not be a part of the policy.60 Many
policies so provide by stating that the master policy, the ap-
plication of the employer and the individual applications of the
employees, if any, shall constitute the entire contract between
the parties.70 But though a certificate is not a part of the policy,
it does not necessarily follow that the laws of the state in which
the master policy was issued and delivered should govern. Most
contributory policies provide that an employee is insured upon
ficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor to some performance
neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the bene-
ficiary." He is a creditor beneficiary "if no purpose to make a gift appears
from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances and
performance of the promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty of
the promisee to the beneficiary, or a right of the beneficiary against the promissee
which has been barred by the Statute of Limitations or by a a discharge in bank-
ruptcy, or which is unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds." The distinc-
tion is important in Anglo-American jurisdictions because unless the power to
change the agreement has been reserved it cannot be changed by agreement of
the parties to the contract without the consent of the donee beneficiary. Id. § 142.
However, a discharge of the promisor by the promisee is effective against a credi-
tor beneficiary unless the creditor beneficiary has materially changed his position
in reliance on the promise or the action is a fraud on creditors. Id. § 143.
67. See note 66 8upra.
68. LA. CIViL CODE arts. 1890, 1902 (1870) carry the French stipulation
pour autrui into Louisiana law. These articles draw no distinction comparable
to the donee and creditor beneficiaries of Anglo-American law. Once it has been
accepted, the stipulation may not be revoked without the consent of the beneficiary
unless the power to do so has been reserved. For a detailed discussion of the
stipulation pour autrui, see Smith, Third Party Beneficiaries in Louisiana: The
Stipulation Pour Autrui, 11 TUL. L. REV. 18 (1936).
69. The terms of the policy are the terms of the agreement between the
parties to the contract. Where the employee is a party and he and the insurer
reach an agreement the terms of that agreement are, of course, the terms of
the policy. Since the employer's application operates as an acceptance of the
insurer's offer of coverage, which is represented by the master policy, the con-
tract comes into existence then and its terms are then fixed. The certificate,
issued subsequently, cannot be a part of that agreement. Where the employee
is a third party beneficiary, the contract of insurance is fixed upon agreement of
the employer and insurer. Again subsequent issuance of a certificate cannot alter
that contract.
70. See note 65 supra.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
application for insurance. Therefore his contract of insurance
is completed in the state where the application is submitted to
the employer and the laws of that state should govern. If the
master policy is so worded as to require acceptance of an appli-
cation before the commencement of coverage, the contract might
properly be held governed by the law of the state of acceptance,
in the absence of statute. However, most states, including Lou-
isiana,' 7 1 undertake to regulate by statute the terms of insurance
contracts delivered within the state. Although a certificate is
not a policy of insurance, it is delivered to employees in lieu of
a policy. Its delivery should be considered equivalent to delivery
of a policy for purposes of determining applicable state law.
The purpose of such statutes is to prevent insurers from insuring
the citizens and inhabitants of a state though escaping the state's
regulations as to policy terms and penalties for failure to per-
form properly. This is exactly what insurers could accomplish
if allowed to accept applications out of state and avoid regulation
by the issuance of certificates rather than policies.
In the absence of a statute of the type discussed above, non-
contributory policies in which the employee is not a party to
the contract 72 should be governed by the laws of the state in
which the master policy is issued and delivered. In the presence
of such a statute, and assuming that delivery of a certificate
under a contributory policy is tantamount to delivery of the
policy, the same result should obtain. Delivery of a certificate
issued under a non-contributory policy should not be held
tantamount to delivery of the policy because the employee is not
a party to the contract. He has not bargained with the insurer
for coverage and the analogy between such an employee and
an insured under an individual policy breaks down here.
Since a certificate is not properly part of the contract, its
terms should not control over conflicting terms of the master
policy. This should be true of contributory as well as non-
contributory policies. However, the insurer should be estopped
to assert master policy provisions which conflict with the terms
of the certificate as a defense against an employee who has
reasonably relied on the terms of the certificate to his detriment.
This may be what courts have in mind when they say that if
there is a difference between the terms of the certificate and
7. LA. R.S. 22:611, 629 (1950).
72. As has been previously pointed out, in certain unusual situations the
employee might be a party even though the policy is non-contributory.
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those of the master policy, the certificate is a part of the con-
tract. Although it may be generally true that consideration is
required to create a legal duty by way of contract, in an other-
wise appropriate case for estoppel there is no reason why the
fact that coverage will be extended should make the doctrine
inapplicable.7 3
Where the employee is a party to the contract the employer,
in his administration of the policy, should generally be con-
sidered an agent of the insurer. In opposition to this view it
has sometimes been said that the employee has an interest in
securing coverage and acts for himself and on behalf of his
employees.7 4 True, the employer has an interest in securing em-
ployee coverage, but this interest is not adverse to that of the
carrier in the sense that the employer stands to gain where the
carrier loses. The work done by the employer in administering
a group policy is work that would have to be done by the insurer
under an individual policy. The employer is the only party with
whom the employee has any direct contact and once the employee
has authorized deductions from his earnings or given notice or
claim of loss to the employer there is little more that he can do.
If the employer is not held to be the insurer's agent, recovery
may be had against him by the employee. In such a case the
employer is forced to pay substantial sums for relatively minor
errors. The insurer, who is in the business of taking risks into
account would appear a better party to bear risks of employer
error. Where the employer has misled the employee as to cover-
age this should still apply. The question in such a situation is
not so much one of agency as it is one of the authority of the
agent. If the insurer makes it abundantly clear to the employee
that the employer has no authority to interpret policies and
waive provisions, then the insurer should have no responsibility
for such action by the employer.7 5
73. Statements that estoppel cannot be used to enlarge coverage probably find
their basis in the idea that to so use estoppel would be to hold binding a promise
not supported by consideration. The idea that a promissor may be bound though
he has not received what is normally thought of as consideration is embodied in
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 90 (1932). It provides: "A promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite
and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise."
74. Boseman v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937) ; Lan-
caster v. Travelers Ins. Co., 54 Ga. App. 718, 189 S.E. 79 (1936); Equitable
Life Assur. Soc. v. Hall, 253 Ky. 450, 69 S.W.2d 977 (1934).
75. Theoretically, the insurer who is forced to pay because of the employer's
negligence then has an action against the employer to recover what he has paid.
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The employee insured by virtue of a non-contributory con-
tract to which he is not a party should not consider his employer
as the insurer's agent. Here the employer acts as one of two
parties to a contract under which the employee is a stipulated
beneficiary. The general rule with respect to third party bene-
ficiaries is that their rights can rise no higher than those of
the party to the contract who secured the stipulation in their
favor. To hold the insurer bound in spite of a breach of the
contract by the insurer on an agency theory would do violence
to this idea.
Under general principles of contract consent of a party is
a prerequisite to termination or modification of the contract
unless he has previously agreed that none will be required. Like-
wise, a donee beneficiary in Anglo-American law generally can-
not be deprived of coverage without his consent. In Louisiana,
the rights of a third party beneficiary who has accepted a stipu-
lation in his favor cannot be modified without his consent. So,
whether the policy is contributory or non-contributory, and
whether the employee is a party to the contract or a third party
beneficiary, consent of the employee should usually be required
to modify or terminate his rights unless the policy provides
otherwise. The inquiry then would shift to the extent of the
employee's rights under the policy with respect to continuance
of his coverage.7 6
Where consent is required the necessity of notice is ines-
However, no such suit was discovered in the preparation of this Comment. Per-
haps this is due to the desire of insurers to remain on good terms with the
employers upon whose cooperation their group insurance plans depend.
76. Thus, if the policy provided that it might be cancelled by the employer
and insurer by mutual agreement at any time, such cancellation would be effective
without consent whether the employee was viewed as a party or not. Generally,
it would seem that the rights of the employee to have the policy kept in force
could extend, at most, to the end of the period for which premiums have been
paid on his behalf. Certainly the insurer and employer do not bind themselves to
continue indefinitely an unsatisfactory arrangement. This idea appears to have
been the basis of decision in the case of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Korneghy,
37 Ala. App. 417, 71 So.2d 292 (1954). There the employer and insurer agreed
to cancel the master policy insofar as it covered a certain class of employees,
and gave appropriate notice of this fact. An employee sued for recovery of all
of the share of premiums he had paid since the beginning of his coverage. In
denying his claim, the court did not say whether he was to be considered as a
party to the contract. It did say, however, that if there was no contractual
obligation upon the employer and insurer to keep the insurance in effect they
were free to modify the arrangement. Other cases looking toward the agreement
between the insurer and employer in determining whether consent was required
are: Satz v. Prudential Ins. Co., 225 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. App. 1949) (modification
of master policy; no consent needed) ; Butler v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 233
Mo. App. 94, 93 S.W.2d 1019 (1936) (cancellation of individual coverage under
master policy; no consent needed).
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capable. However, a failure to notify might properly result in
insurer liability in situations where consent is not needed. It
may be possible to find policies which indicate that notice is re-
quired as a prerequisite to an effective termination of the con-
tractual obligations created by the policy. Nevertheless, where
a failure to notify is to result in insurer liability, estoppel should
more often be the appropriate vehicle. The difference, of course,
is that where recovery is based on estoppel the employee must
show reasonable reliance to detriment. Since estoppel may oper-
ate in the absence of contract, it should be applicable whether
the employee is a party or merely a third party beneficiary. A
difference might arise between these two policy situations, how-
ever, with respect to the extent the employer could be the agent
of the insurer so as to bind the insurer through estoppel.
For errors in performing those functions in which the em-
ployer acts as agent of the insurer, the employee should have no
recovery against the employer since in such a situation the em-
ployer has caused him no loss. However, the employer whose
negligent administration of a contract to which the employee is
a party has freed the insurer of responsibility should be liable
for the loss sustained by the employee.7 7 Similarly, where the
employee has reasonably relied to his loss on negligent employer
conduct he should be able to hold the employer accountable even
though under the contract the insurer was never responsible for
the loss sustained.7 8 Having undertaken to administer or inter-
pret the policy the employer should be held to have assumed a
duty to exercise reasonable care in that respect. Under a policy
conferring gratuitous coverage it is doubtful that the employer
is burdened with a duty to preserve coverage. Nevertheless,
wherever conduct of the employer can be fitted into a pattern of
misleading action causing reasonable reliance and consequent
injury recovery should be appropriate.
Robert B. Butler III
77. Thus, for example, an employer, whose failure to forward a claim of
loss relieved the insurer of liability, should bear the loss.
78. An example of this situation would be the case of an employer who negli-
gently informed an employee that he was entitled to disability benefits when such
was not the case. In this category might be put also cases where the employer
fails to notify the employee of a change in coverage. On this point see note 59
supra.
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